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INTRODUCTION
At midnight on December 19, 1999, European colonization in
China' ended.2 Based on the Sino-Portuguese Declaration of 1987
("Macau Joint Declaration"),3 Portugal ceded control of its oldest
colony,4 Macau,5 to the People's Republic of China6 ("PRC"). Macau
followed in the footsteps of its neighbor, Hong Kong,7 and through
1. See Guiguo Wang & Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two Systems:
Theory into Practice, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 279, 280 (1998) (commenting that
China unfairly lost land to four countries through treaties).
2. See Martin Regg Cohn, Macau's Blood-Stained Year, TORONTO STAR, Jan.
31, 1999, at A2 (mentioning that Macau's reversion to China signifies the end of
colonialism in East Asia).
3. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China
and The Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau, Apr.
13, 1987, P.R.C.-Port., available in (visited June 17, 1999) <http://www.imprensa.
macau.gov.mo/dc/declconj.e.htm> [hereinafter Macau Joint Declaration] (outlin-
ing the policies by which Portugal and China must abide upon reversion).
4. See Edward Neilan, China to Sweep Macau Clean, J. COM., May 20, 1999,
at 4A (commenting that for the past 442 years, Portugal has ruled Macau, the old-
est European colony).
5. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND
NOTES: MACAU, AUGUST 1994 (Aug. 1994) (visited May 25, 1999)
<http:///www.state.gov/www/background-notes/macau_0894_bgn.html> (explain-
ing that Macau consists of three areas: (1) The main area, which is a sixteen square
kilometer zone situated on China's peninsula; (2) the islands of Taipa, which is 3
square kilometers; and (3) Coloane, a 7 square kilometer island); see also Adinin-
istrative Divisions, Hong Kong and Macau (visited May 25, 1999)
<http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/news/HongKongMacao.html> (indicating
Macau's geographical position as west of the Pearl River Delta, 40 nautical miles
to the west of Hong Kong near, China's Guangdong Province).
6. See The People's Republic of China (visited July 29, 1999)
<http://www.chaos.umd.edu/history/prc.html> (detailing the rise of the PRC since
its formation on October 1, 1949).
7. See John H. Henderson, Note, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the
People's Republic of China: What it Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28
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reversion, became China's second Special Administrative Region
("SAR"). As a result of this reversion, a Basic Law similar to the
one that governs Hong Kong9 now serves Macau. '" Like a mini-
constitution, the Basic Law guarantees Macau autonomy in all areas
except foreign affairs and defense."
Although the Basic Law appears to grant Macau enormous free-
doms, 2 the international community is apprehensive that China will
not adhere to the document.'" This concern stems from China's re-
cent overruling of Hong Kong's highest court's decision regarding
an issue outside China's jurisdiction." This revocation of Hong
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 508 n.14 (1995) (explaining that Hong Kong con-
sists of four separate areas: Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, the New Ter-
ritories, and Stonecutters Island).
8. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 2(1) (discussing the effect
of Article 31 of the Chinese constitution); see also XIANFA, art. 31 (1982), re-
printed in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 43 (Albert Blaustein
& Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1992) [hereinafter CHINA
CONST.] (granting China the power to create SARs). See generally Wang & Leung,
supra note 1, at 283-84 (explaining that the SAR relationship to China is based on
the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy).
9. See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Basic Law of the Hong Kong
SpecialAdministrative Region of the People's Republic of China (visited Nov. 12,
1999) <http://vww.tdc.org.hkfbeyond97/hongkong/preamble.htm> [hereinafter
Hong Kong Basic Law] (serving as Hong Kong's mini-constitution).
10. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 2(12) (stating that the
provisions in the Macau Joint Declaration will be codified in Macau's Basic Law).
11. See Basic Law: Macau, Presidential Decree, No. 3 (Mar. 31, 1993), pream-
ble, arts. 12-14 (visited May 25, 1999) <http://vww.umac.moibasiclaw/english/
main.html> [hereinafter Macau Basic Law] (outlining the basic policies governing
the region after reversion based on the "One Country, Two Systems" policy).
China gained jurisdiction over matters of defense and foreign affairs, while the
Macau government retained autonomy of its local affairs. See id.
12. See id. art. 27 (listing the civil liberties granted to Macau after its rever-
sion). Such liberties include "freedom of speech, of the press and of publication;
freedom of association, assembly, [o]f procession and of demonstration; and the
right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike." Id.
13. Cf A Question of Iterpretation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 19, 1999,
at 17 [hereinafter A Question of Interpretation] (discussing the possible erosion of
Hong Kong's autonomy if China persists in carving out exceptions to the rule of
law).
14. See Michael Laris, China Throws Out Ruling of Hong Kong Court, WASH.
POST FOREIGN SERVICE, June 27, 1999, at A23 (reporting that China's overruling
of Hong Kong's highest court's decision regarding the right of abode, an issue out-
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Kong's judicial autonomy illustrates China's willingness to intervene
and limit decisions with which it disagrees, despite its lack of juris-
diction."
The repercussions of China's treatment of Hong Kong extend far
beyond the region's borders. In effect, because Macau's reversion
parallels that of Hong Kong,' 6 it is conceivable that China may inter-
vene in Macau's autonomy in areas not within its jurisdiction. 7 In
particular, there is reason to suspect that China may attempt to over-
ride Macau's judicial autonomy regarding its criminal laws'9 due to a
recent crime wave '9 that has struck the region.' ° China's attempt to
curb this violence by abrogating the Macau Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law is potentially devastating to Macau's independent future.2'
side China's jurisdiction, threatens Hong Kong's autonomy); see also -long Kong
Basic Law, supra note 9, arts. 13-14 (limiting Hong Kong's autonomy on issues
outside of foreign affairs and defense).
15. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 287 (quoting Deng Xiaoping, China's
former Communist leader, as outlining two instances in which China could inter-
vene in Hong Kong's autonomy). The two instances are: (1) if the "One Country,
Two Systems" policy is threatened; and (2) if Hong Kong itself needed assistance.
See id.
16. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 2 (explaining that
Macau's transition is based on the "One Country, Two Systems" policy); cf Peo-
ple's Republic of China-United Kingdom: Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong,
Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Hong Kong Joint Declaration]
(setting forth the "One Country, Two Systems" principle as the foundation for the
transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty from Britain to China).
17. See Bruce Gilley, Officers of the Law, China's Plans for Macau 's Garrison
Raise Autonomy Concerns, FAR E. ECON. REV. (July 15, 1999) (visited July 22,
1999) <http://203.105.48.72/9907_15/p23macau.html> (reporting that pro-
democracy activists fear that China's decision to send in an army will not stop
there, but could threaten Macau's autonomy not only on the issue of the garrison
but on other issues as well).
18. See id. (commenting on China's concern regarding the increase in gang
violence in Macau).
19. See Bertil Lintner, End of an Empire: A Year Before Macau's Handover to
China, Corruption and Crime Reign as Get-Quick-Rich Deals Abound (Dec. 24,
1998) (on file with author) (analyzing the reasons behind the escalation in Macau's
gang violence).
20. See id. (commenting on China's decision to station approximately 4,000
troops around Macau).
21. See Gilley, supra note 17 (commenting that China's willingness to inter-
vene is a cause for concern for the SARs).
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This Comment addresses the potential threat of China's interven-
tion in Macau's autonomy regarding its criminal laws, an area out-
side China's jurisdiction. Furthermore, China's recent overruling of
Hong Kong's highest court, regarding immigration, an issue not
within China's authority, substantiates this fear. Part I of this Com-
ment provides a brief history of the settlement of Macau and lays the
foundation for its reversion. This part also discusses the relevant
provisions of Macau's Basic Law.
To better understand China's relationship to its former colonies,
Part II gives a brief summary of the origin and establishment of
Hong Kong as a SAR as well as the laws that govern the former
British colony. Part III outlines the differences between Macau and
Hong Kong's transitions, and illustrates how Macau is more vulner-
able to abuse. This part also analyzes the implications of China's re-
cent overruling of Hong Kong's highest court and its possible impact
on Macau. Part IV recommends strategies for the Macau government
to safeguard its autonomy following reversion. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that Macau's future will be secure as long as it
maintains its autonomy from the mainland, despite the challenges it
faces upon its decolonization.
I. THE END OF COLONIZATION IN ASIA
A. BEHIND THE SCENES OF ASIA'S CASABLANCA
Macau, a tiny enclave located on the Southeast China coast, is of-
ten referred to as Hong Kong's sleepy neighbor.: Macau, unlike
Hong Kongj is better known for its gambling industry2' and organ-
ized crime' than as a financial center.
22. See John Colmey, Tales from the Dragonhead, 151 TIME ASIA 15, Apr.
20, 1998 (on file with author) (referring to Macau as a haven for organized crime).
Macau is better known as "the Casablanca of the 1990s, a crossroads of interna-
tional criminals, and the money laundering capital of Asia." Id.
23. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 506 (describing Hong Kong's evolution
from a trading post to an international financial center).
24. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (stating that in 1994, tour-
ism and gambling made up 46% of Macau's economy).
25. See Neilan, supra note 4, at 4A (describing a range of illegal activities
prevalent in Macau); see also Nei' Afacau Leader to Focus on Crime, Chinese
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
The history of Portuguese settlement in Macau dates back four
centuries.26 Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth
century, Macau was primarily a place for asylum from invaders.7
When the Portuguese arrived in the sixteenth century, " Macau was
only a small fishing community.2 9 In 1553, the Portuguese bribed"'
local government agents in Guangdong, China3' to authorize them to
trade in Macau's harbor.32 As a result, Macau became a major settle-
ment for the Portuguese.33
Although Portugal succeeded in having China acknowledge its
presence in Macau in 1557, it failed to achieve sovereignty.14 To le-
gitimately reside in Macau, the Portuguese paid rent to the native
Chinese." In the seventeenth century, the Dutch and the English ar-
Handover CNN (May 15, 1999) (visited May 25, 1999) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/
asiapcf/9905/15/macau.elex> (discussing the circumstances that led to the success
of organized crime in Macau).
26. See Ma Zongshi, Macau Handover Will Mark the End of Colonial Rule in
Asia, CHINA 2000, at 2 (Aug. 1999) (providing a brief description of the history of
Macau, its transition period from the signing of the Joint Macau Declaration, and a
forecast for its future).
27. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (noting that the Chinese rec-
ords for Macau dating back to 1152 indicate that Macau remained unpopulated un-
til the 13th century, at which time, refugees arrived from the South Sung Dynasty).
28. See Macau: History (visited May 25, 1999) <http://www.macau.gov.mo/
engjtxt/history.html> (discussing Portugal's original intentions for Macau).
29. See Macau: Review 1998, ASIA & PAC. REV. WORLD OF INFO., Nov. 1998,
at I (describing Macau in the 16th century).
30. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I) (Mar. 1999) (visited June 29,
1999) <http://www.china-embassy.org/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl?macaoreturn 1> (explain-
ing that Portugal persuaded China to permit the Portuguese to settle in Macau tin-
der false pretenses).
31. See Guangzhou (1996) (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http://www.chinapages.
com/guangdong/guangzhou/guangzhou.htm> (describing Guangdong as an old,
commercial city located in the southern part of China).
32. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (noting that Portugal found
Macau attractive as a trading port).
33. See id. (explaining the history of Portugal's colonization of Macau).
34. See id. (commenting that despite the presence of a Portuguese executive in
the enclave, Portugal could not prevent China from imposing taxes on Macau).
35. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question I
(discussing Portugal's attempts to gain sovereignty over Macau from China).
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rived in Macau to partake in trade. ' 6 The British simultaneously be-
gan to develop its trading industry in Hong Kong, which quickly be-
came profitable. 7 To capitalize on the opportunities that Hong
Kong's immense growth presented, many companies fled to Hong
Kong.3' The fierce competition from its neighbor drove Macau into a
severe recession that lasted almost one hundred years."
In 1687 and 1753, Portuguese ambassadors met with officials in
Beijing, but failed to secure China's surrender of sovereignty over
Macau to PortugalPo After the Opium War ended in 1842,' the Por-
tuguese captured Taipa and Coloane Islands from the Qing'" gov-
ernment.4 ' Three decades later, in 1887, the Qing government con-
cluded that Portugal had jurisdiction over Macau in perpetuity and
signed the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking," also known as the
Protocol of Lisbon.4 ' This Treaty permitted the Portuguese to reside
36. See Macau: History, supra note 28 (describing the competition among the
various European countries over Asian commodities).
37. See id. (describing England's motives for concentrating on Hong Kong's
trade industry).
38. See id. (discussing the advantages of trading in Hong Kong).
39. See id. (analyzing the cause of Macau's depressed trade industry).
40. See Macau: History, supra note 28 (describing Portugal's attempts to ob-
tain sovereignty over Macau).
41. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 507 (providing a brief description of the
Opium War, which lasted from 1839-1842).
42. See Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Countr; Two Systems".
Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Con-
flicts of Law in China, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 298 (1995) (describing
the Qing Dynasty as the last dynasty of Imperial China, which ruled from 1640 to
1911).
43. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part 1, supra note 30, at question I
(noting that Portugal's occupation of Macau culminated after gaining control over
Taipa and Coloane islands from the use of force between 1851 and 1864).
44. See Administrative Divisions, Hong Kong and Macau, supra note 5 (sug-
gesting that the treaties were invalid because China was allegedly coerced into ac-
quiescing).
45. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (referring to the Manchu-
Portuguese Agreement as the Protocol of Lisbon); see also -hdninistrative Divi-
sions, Hong Kong and Macau, supra note 5 (referring to the Manchu-Portuguese
Agreement as the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking).
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in and govern Macau as a colony,46 but limited Portugal from trans-
ferring Macau's sovereignty to another country.7 Following the
signing of this agreement, China and Portugal signed the Treaty of
Commerce and Friendship 48 in 1888. This Treaty finally authorized
the transfer of Macau's sovereignty to the Portuguese government.".
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") found the Sino-
Portuguese Treaty of Peking ° unjust and voided the agreement." Ac-
cording to the CCP, China was coerced into signing the treaty. 2 Al-
though Beijing wanted to reunify Macau, it did not pursue reunifica-
tion until 1955,53 at which time Portugal acquired Macau as a
colony.1
4
Despite Portugal's attempts to return Macau to China in 1966 and
1974;", it was unsuccessful because China was more concerned with
46. See Administrative Divisions, Hong Kong and Macau, supra note 5 (ex-
plaining that Portugal began occupying Macau in 1887, following the signing of
the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking).
47. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (reiterating the concept that
despite Portuguese rule, Macau will always be considered part of mainland China).
48. See Macau: History, supra note 28 (stating that the Treaty of Commerce
and Friendship was executed on August 28, 1888).
49. See id. (observing that while the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship rec-
ognized Portuguese sovereignty over Macau, China never ratified it).
50. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (explaining the CCP's rea-
sons for nullifying the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking).
51. See generally Steven L. Chan, Differences Between British and Chinese
Views of Law Forebode Uncertainties for Hong Kong's People After the 1997
Transfer, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 138, 145-46 (1996) (citing WILLIAM H.
OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW
SUPERPOWER 250 (1993)) (noting that China has consistently maintained that
many treaties, including the Sino-British Treaty that transferred Hong Kong's sov-
ereignty to the United Kingdom, are one-sided).
52. See id. (asserting China's view that a treaty imposed by foreigners is une-
qual).
53. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (noting that China pro-
longed addressing the issue of Macau because of other pressing matters).
54. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question I
(describing Macau's transformation from a Chinese trading port to a Portuguese
colony).
55. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (commenting that the Portu-
guese attempted to return Macau to China after the 1966 Communist riots in
Macau and the 1974 military coup d'6tat in Portugal).
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reunifying Hong Kong. In 1979, an amicable relationship developed
between the two countries.57 At that point, Portugal formally ac-
cepted Macau as Chinese territory and agreed to its reversion."' Soon
thereafter, in 1987, the two countries executed the "Joint Declaration
of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau.""
This Declaration mandated the return of Macau to China as a SAR
on December 20, 1999.60
B. CHANGING OF THE GUARD
The Macau Joint Declaration is premised on Deng Xiaoping's"
"One Country, Two Systems" policy. 2 The PRC contrived this pol-
icy to ensure a smooth reunification of the mainland." China initially
intended to apply this model to Taiwan.' The PRC decided to im-
56. See id. (noting China's preoccupation with reunifying Hong Kong to the
mainland).
57. See id. (illustrating China and Portugal's interest in resolving the Macau
issue).
58. See Macau: History, supra note 28 (describing the events precipitating
Portugal's decision to return Macau).
59. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (noting that after the signing
of the Macau Joint Declaration, Macau would remain a colony of Portugal for only
twelve more years).
60. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, art. I (outlining the provisions
of Macau's reversion pertaining to Chinese sovereignty).
61. See Chan, supra note 51, at 156-57 (explaining that the reformist approach
of former Communist leader, Deng Xiaoping, stressed modernization and extenu-
ated domestic central planning by loosening controls over pricing, wages, devel-
opment, and industry). This modem approach to economics and investment trans-
formed China's economy from being eighty percent state owned in 1978 to fifty
percent in 1994. See id.
62. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, art. 2 (stipulating that the "One
Country, Two Systems" policy will govern the provisions outlined in the Joint
Declaration); see also Wang & Leung, supra note I, at 284-85 (commenting that
the "One Country, Two Systems" policy promotes the simultaneous but separate
exercise of socialism and capitalism).
63. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 284 (discussing Deng Xiaoping's be-
lief that the "One Country, Two Systems" policy would be the most effective
means to reunify China with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan).
64. See Chang King-yuh, Evaluation of "One Countor. Two Systenis " in flong
Kong (visited June 1, 1999) <http://vwv.taipei.org/hk/hk06l8.htm> (asserting that
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plement this system earlier, however, because of the imminence of• 61
Hong Kong's transfer to China.
The "One Country, Two Systems" policy is premised on the con-
cept that the Central Government of China will serve as a socialist
system, while the SARs, Hong Kong, Macau, and perhaps eventually
Taiwan,66 will maintain their economic systems and all laws in effect
before its reversion for fifty years.67 Under this system, the PRC may
not intervene in the SARs' autonomy unless the issue concerns for-
eign affairs or defense. 68 Although the phrase "One Country, Two
Systems" suggests separate and equal systems, the stress is on the
"One Country" aspect. 69 In crafting this policy, Deng Xiaoping made
clear that the SARs are a part of a socialist regime and that their
freedom to engage in capitalism should not be taken for granted."°
the "One Country, Two Systems" policy is not an appropriate model for Taiwan).
65. See Sean Cooney, Why Taiwan is not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC"
"One Country Two Systems" Model for Reunification with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L.
& POL'Y J. 497, 501-09 (1997) (discussing the origin and purpose of the "One
Country, Two Systems" model and how it would be applied to Taiwan).
66. See Huang & Qian, supra note 42, at 301-02 (commenting on China's hope
for reunification with Taiwan due to the opening of communications between the
two governments). But see Cooney, supra note 65, at 546-47 (explaining that the
"One Country, Two Systems" policy is no longer applicable to Taiwan).
67. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 5 (stating that "the socialist sys-
tem and policies shall not be practiced in the [Macau and Hong Kong] Special
Administrative Region[s], and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall
remain unchanged for fifty years"); Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 5;
see also Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, art. 2.12 (establishing a 50 year
period for the SARs to maintain their current systems).
68. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 298 n.76 (discussing the implications
of the exception to Hong Kong's autonomy).
69. See id. at 285 n.27 (citing Ioeng Wan Chong, "ONE COUNTRY, Two
SYSTEMS" AND THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL SCIENCE 89-90 (1996) (suggesting
that the "One Country" principle trumps the "Two Systems" aspect of the policy,
such that Beijing would intervene into the SAR's internal affairs, if necessary to
preserve the "One Country" principle); see also Byron Weng, As the PRC Political
Culture Seeps into Hong Kong, CSIS HONG KONG UPDATE (Jan. 1998) (visited
July 1, 1999) <http://www.csis.org/html/hk5.html> (comparing the differences
between the United States' system of federalism and China's "One Country, Two
Systems" policy).
70. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 284-85 n.23 (citing A Reliable Guar-
antee of Hong Kong's Long-Term Stability and Prosperity, HONGQI, Oct. 21, 1984,
at 21-22, quoted in Denis Chang, Towards a Jurisprudence of a Third Kind "One
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Thus, according to the PRC, the autonomy of the SARs is limited. "
Accordingly, based on the underlying concept of the policy, China
may legitimately interfere in the SARs' autonomy, if the principle of
"One Country" is hindered. "
C. SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE MACAU JOINT
DECLARATION
The Macau Joint Declaration authorizes Macau's return to the
PRCn and lays the foundation for its reversion.7' The parties codified
the policies set forth in the Macau Joint Declaration in the Basic
Law,75 which serves as the enclave's mini-constitution."
The signing of the Declaration signifies that both Portugal and the
PRC hope to strengthen the economic and social prosperity of
Macau.7 The enforcement of the Declaration assures the interna-
tional community that the citizens of Macau" will be guaranteed
Country, Two Systems", 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 94, 103-04 (1988)) (ex-
plaining the purpose of SARs and their relationship to China under the "'One
Country, Two Systems" policy).
71. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 285 (discussing the circumstances that
may bring about China's intervention in the SARs' autonomy).
72. See id. (forecasting China's intervention in the SAPs' autonomy). The four
"cardinal principles" of China's socialist system are upholding the pursuit of the
socialist road, proletarian dictatorship, communist party leadership, and adherence
to Marxist-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. See id. at 285 n. 24.
73. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3 (identifying the major provi-
sions of the Treaty, which the Chinese government agreed to adhere to regarding
the transfer of sovereignty).
74. See id. (listing the provisions of the treaty that are to govern the transfer of
Macau).
75. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, U.S. Department of State, Macau Countr" Report on flunian Rights Prac-
tices for 1998 (Feb. 26, 1999) (visited May 25, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/
www/global/humanrights/1998-hrp-report/macau.html> (explaining briefly the
purpose of the Macau Basic Law, namely to serve as Macau's constitution and to
preserve many laws which were in effect prior to reversion).
76. But see Chan, supra note 51, at 160 (discussing the reasons why the Hong
Kong Basic Law cannot be considered a mini-constitution).
77. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3 (outlining the means by which
Macau may succeed in these two areas).
78. See Macau: Country Profile, ASIA & PAC. REV. WORLD OF INFO., Nov.
1998, at 1 (reporting that Macau's population in 1996 was comprised of approxi-
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freedoms and rights based on Portuguese and Western principles."'
China's and Portugal's execution of the Declaration illustrates their
commitment to Macau. 0 Thus, because China is a signatory to this
Treaty, it should fulfill its pledge under international law.'
Under the Macau Joint Declaration, Macau became a SAR
("MSAR") of the PRC based on Article 31 of the Chinese Constitu-
tion.82 Macau maintains a "high degree of autonomy" in its executive,
legislative, and judicial power but accedes to Chinese governance
concerning matters of foreign affairs and defense. 3 The reversion did
not alter Macau's current social or economic systems, including all
laws in effect prior to the handover.84 The Declaration also grants the
Macau government the right to have its own law enforcement."
In addition to domestic benefits, the Declaration also permits
mately 455,000 people, of which 96% were ethnic Chinese and 4% were mixed
Portuguese and Chinese, or "Mavanese"); see also Neilan, supra note 4, at 4A (de-
scribing Macau's population as consisting primarily of priests, pirates, and prosti-
tutes).
79. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra note 75
(describing the extensive human rights principles that are prevalent in Macau, in-
cluding abolition of the death penalty, life imprisonment, and protection of civil
liberties); see also Macau: The Judicial System (last modified Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://www.macau.gov.mo/engjtxt/judicial.html> (describing Macau's Penal
Code as humanitarian and modem).
80. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question 2
(explaining that the Macau Joint Declaration is a bilateral international agreement).
81. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for sig-
nature May 23, 1969, art. 11, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (explaining that under Article 11, certain actions, such as a sig-
nature, indicate that a nation has consented to binding itself to the international
agreement).
82. See CHINA CONST., supra note 8, art. 31 (stating that when necessary the
state may establish special administrative regions and the National People's Con-
gress ("NPC") can enact the governing laws which prescribe the system particular
to the SAR). Accordingly, Article 62(13) of the Constitution grants the NPC juris-
diction over the formation of SARs and its institutions. See id. art. 62(13).
83. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 2, 19 (outlining the MSAR's
powers).
84. See id. art. 8 (reinforcing the concept of the "One Country, Two Systems"
policy by letting the SAR remain a capitalistic economy rather than converting it to
a socialist system).




Macau to remain a party to any international agreements to which it
was a member, despite China's absence." Furthermore, China shall
ensure that Macau maintain its affiliation with all international or-
ganizations even though China is not a participantY By permitting
Macau to remain connected to these international agreements and or-
ganizations, China also is indirectly committing itself to these inter-
national agreements.
In order to implement the Declaration, China and Portugal selected
China's National People's Congress ("NPC") to legislate a Basic
Law for Macau. The Basic Law codifies all provisions outlined in
the Macau Joint Declaration" and will serve as the MSAR's mini
constitution.9'
D. MACAU'S BASIC LAW AS THE NEW RULE OF LAW
On March 31, 1993, the NPC ratified the Macau Basic Law, which
the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group92 drafted." The purpose of
the Basic Law is to reinforce the "One Country, Two Systems" pol-
86. See id. art. 138 (allowing Macau to retain a separate identity from China
through the implementation of international agreements to which China is not a
party).
87. See id. art. 137 (explaining that regardless of its membership, the PRC will
take steps to ensure that the MSAR will remain a participant of the international
organizations to which Macau committed itself to prior to reversion).
88. See Gilley, supra note 17 (reporting that pro-democracy leaders suggest
that one of China's priorities is to present a new respectable image to the interna-
tional community through its handling of the SARs).
89. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex 1, at I (authorizing the
Central People's Government to integrate the policies outlined in the Macau Joint
Declaration into Macau's Basic Law).
90. See id. at 12 (noting that the policies set out in the first one through eleven
sections of Article 2 of the Joint Declaration will be codified in Macau's Basic
Law and will remain in effect for 50 years).
91. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 294-96 (explaining why the Hong
Kong Basic Law does not constitute a constitution).
92. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 5 (setting forth the responsi-
bilities of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group).
93. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11 (confirming the ratification of the Ba-
sic Law).
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icy into the domestic law affirmed by the Macau Joint Declaration.'
Thus, by implementing a Basic Law, China is guaranteed that Macau
will recognize its policies."
The Macau Basic Law models itself after the Hong Kong Basic
Law 96 and ensures that the current laws97 of Macau, with the excep-
tion of foreign affairs and defense,98 will remain in effect for fifty
years after Macau's reversion." The Organic Statute of 1976, revised
in 1990,'00 stipulates the present laws that were maintained at the turn
of the century.' Based on the Portuguese legal system,02 the statute
grants the enclave significant autonomy in various areas.'3 In par-
ticular, China has integrated Macau's judicial autonomy into the
94. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question 4
(explaining why the codification of the Macau Joint Declaration is necessary).
95. See id. (noting that Macau's autonomy is authorized through the imple-
mentation of a Basic Law).
96. See Chan, supra note 51, at 160 (commenting on the differences between
Hong Kong and Macau's Basic Law).
97. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, question 10
(discussing types of laws currently in effect that are expected to survive reversion).
98. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 19 (stating that the MSAR will
lack jurisdiction over acts of defense and foreign affairs issues); see also Questions
& Answers on M'acau (Part I), supra note 30, at question 13 (explaining the lim-
ited national laws applied to Macau under Article 18).
99. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 5 (providing that the current le-
gal, economic, and social systems will survive at least five decades from the day of
reversion); see also id. art. 8 (commenting on the criteria for determining which
laws are to remain in effect following reversion).
100. See Estatuto Organico de Macau, 1976 (visited June 29, 1999) <http://
www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/eo/cap2.htm> [hereinafter ORGANIC STATUTE OF
1976] (setting forth Macau's laws that are to be maintained after reversion).
101. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question 10
(explaining the method in which Portuguese laws may remain in effect after
Macau's reversion).
102. See Huang & Qian, supra note 42, at 300 (giving a general description of
the Macau legal system); see also Manuel Trigo, Macau 's Civil Law, GABINETE
PARA A TRADUCAO JURIDICA (visited June 17, 1999) <http://www. gtj.macau.gov.
mo/html/perdir/02/pd02f002.asp> (describing the principles behind Macau's civil
law system, which are premised on the Portuguese legal system).
103. See Lusa News Portfolio (visited May 25, 1999) <http://www.
lusa.pt/lusanews/portfol.html> (listing five areas where Macau has autonomy un-
der the Organic Statute).
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Macau Basic Law through the creation of a Court of Final Appeal.'"
In addition to providing the MSAR with great autonomy, the
Macau Basic Law also incorporates Macau's criminal laws'"' that
were enacted while subject to Portuguese rule.'"' Macau's criminal
system is based on Portugal's policy of rehabilitating criminals.'""
The Basic Law recognizes both the principles behind the criminal
procedures stipulated in the Macau Penal Procedure Code"" and the
substantive criminal laws set forth in Macau's Penal Code." Given
that Portuguese principles are instilled throughout Macau's Basic
Law,"0 the death penalty and life imprisonment prohibition continues
even after reversion. Macau's sentencing requirements"2 also pre-
104. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 84 (describing the various courts
and their responsibilities); see also Macau: The Judicial Sivstm, supra note 79
(analyzing Macau's present judicial system).
105. See Legislacao de Macau Codigo Penal, arts. 129, 288 (visited June 29,
1999) <http://-vvv/gtj.macau/gov.mo/html/legismac/cpindex.asp> [hereinafter
Macau Penal Code] (outlining the crimes and corresponding penalties in Macau);
see also Macau's Criminal Law Becomes Effective 1 Jan., BEIJING XINHUA IN
ENGLISH (Jan. 1, 1996) (visited June 15, 1999) <http://199.221.15.21/cgibin/
cqcg.. .5+6+7+8+9+10&CQDOCMARKUP_STYLE=I> (commenting on the
method by which Macau's criminal laws came into effect).
106. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 85 (alluding to the preservation
of Macau's Penal Code).
107. See Harold Bruning, Judiciar, Under hIternational Spotlight, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 30, 1999, at 17 (giving reasons as to why the Macau penal
system is considered humane).
108. See Macau Basic Law, supra note I1, art. 29 (addressing the criminal rights
of Macau's residents regarding Macau's criminal procedures). If Macau's residents
are subjected to criminal prosecution, they shall be presumed innocent and given
an early trial. See id.; see also Macau: The Judicial System, supra note 79 (dis-
cussing the history of the Macau Penal Procedure Code).
109. See Macau Penal Code, supra note 105.
110. See Macau: The Judicial System, supra note 79 (describing Portugal's po-
sition on punishment). Macau's Penal Code is based on the more humanistic prin-
ciples of the Portuguese legal system, which deems imprisonment as a vehicle for
rehabilitation rather than punishment. See id.
111. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 28 (outlining specific criminal
rights of Macau's citizens).
112. See Macau Penal Code, supra note 105, art. 129 (stipulating the sentence
requirements for crimes committed in Macau).
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vailed"3 even though they differ from China's policy toward criminal
law.114 Moreover, because Macau's Basic Law does not explicitly
eradicate capital punishment or life imprisonment, scholars may in-
quire as to whether China will adhere to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")"5 and other international
agreements after Macau's reversion."6
II. LESSONS FROM HONG KONG
A. HONG KONG'S REVERSION
China has granted Macau certain liberties and a great level of
autonomy through its Basic Law, however, these rights are not guar-
anteed.' 7 China may conceivably alter Macau's Basic Law to suit its
own interests." 8 An accurate forecast of how the PRC will handle
113. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 8 (granting Macau the right to
institute most laws that are in effect before the reversion); see also Macau Ques-
tions & Answers (Part I), supra note 30 (explaining what laws constitute local
laws). See generally Xiao Shengxi & Suo Zhengjie, Comparative Study of the
Criminal Procedure in Macau and in China, GABINETE PARA A TRADUCAO
JURIDICA (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http://www.gtj.macau.gov.mo/html/perdir/
01/abstracts.asp> (analyzing the principal differences between China and Macau's
criminal procedure laws).
114. See CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 48 (Procu-
ratorial Press 1st ed. 1997) (explaining implementation requirements for the death
penalty in particular cases).
115. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on Mar. 23. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
Although this covenant is non-binding, the signatories to this covenant ensure its
citizens and the citizens of its respective colonies that they will abide by these civil
and political rights. See id.; see also Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Portugal (Macau): Portugal Macau, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.77, at B(4) (1997) [hereinafter Observations of the Human Rights
Committee] (suggesting that Macau is still bound to the ICCPR because of seces-
sionist principles even though China was not a signatory to the covenant).
116. See Huang & Qian, supra note 42, at 305-06 (analyzing potential conflicts
between the local laws of various geographical regions and the international trea-
ties applicable to those regions); see also Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 40
(authorizing Macau's affiliation with any agreements that existed before the rever-
sion, including the ICCPR).
117. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 11-14 (stating three exceptions
where China may impose upon Macau's jurisdiction).
118. See Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 285 (reiterating that certain instances
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Macau may be determined by analyzing Hong Kong since its rever-
sion."9 China recently intervened in a case before the Hong Kong ju-
diciary 20 involving an issue unrelated to foreign affairs or defense.'-"
China's intervention in Hong Kong should alert the international
community that China might do the same with Macau."-
Hong Kong's transition serves as a good paradigm for Macau be-
cause both Portugal and Britain relinquished sovereignty of their
colonies to China under the "One Country, Two Systems" policy.':'
In addition, it is worth noting that Macau and Hong Kong each have
their own separate Basic Laws.'24 Although the Basic Law that gov-
erns Hong Kong differs from Macau's mini-constitution,'25 the con-
cepts behind both documents are similar.' 6 Both Basic Laws outline
China's commitment to preserving the capitalist systems that are
prevalent in each territory.'2 7 Furthermore, both mini-constitutions
provide the SARs with high autonomy in areas unrelated to foreign
may arise that allow China to intervene).
119. See Gilley, supra note 17 (reporting that China's overruling of Hong
Kong's Supreme Court on an issue outside its jurisdiction reflects the possible
disintegration of Macau's Basic Law).
120. See HK Constitutional Row Looms Over China Innigrants, INSIDE ClIlNA
TODAY (June 29, 1999) (visited June 29, 1999) <http:,'www.insidechina.
com/news.php3?id=76059> (referring to problems with China's immigration rul-
ing).
121. See Anthony Spaeth et al., So Much .for Autonomy, TIME ASIA, May 31,
1999, at 22 (setting forth examples of China's intervention in the internal atTairs of
Hong Kong).
122. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. El 148-03, E 1151 (daily ed. June 7, 1999) (state-
ment of Rep. Bereuter) (explaining concerns on the future of Hong Kong's legal
system because of China's recent intervention).
123. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, art. 2; (:f Hong Kong Joint
Declaration, supra note 16 (detailing the similarities between both documents).
124. See Macau Basic Law, supra note I 1; see also Hong Kong Basic Law, su-
pra note 9 (providing each territory its own set of laws and freedoms).
125. See Huang & Qian, supra note 42, at 300 (asserting that the divergence
between the Macau Basic Law and Hong Kong's mini-constitution is a direct result
of their separate historical evolutions).
126. See id. at 290-91 (explaining that MSAR's and HKSAR's joint declarations
and mini-constitutions incorporate Deng's policy).
127. See id. at 303 (noting that Hong Kong and Macau remain capitalist socie-
ties, despite China's commitment to socialism).
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affairs and defense.'2 8 To better compare Hong Kong and Macau, and
their relationship with China, an understanding of the events pre-
cipitating Hong Kong's transfer to a SAR is necessary. Accordingly,
the sections that follow will highlight the key events that led to Hong
Kong's transition.
B. FROM RAGS TO RICHES
During the nineteenth century, Britain's interest in Hong Kong in-
creased as it pursued Chinese commodities.'2"9 Initially, the British
suffered a trade deficit 3" with China because Britain was unable to
export high quantities of goods to the Chinese. When the British
started to barter opium with the Chinese, however, the trade imbal-
ance began to diminish.'3' The British soon realized that the forego-
ing solution was inadequate because the Chinese put an embargo on
the drug, which ultimately resulted in the Opium War.'32
At the end of the war in 1842, the Treaty of Nanking conveyed
Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom. " Despite Britain's vic-
tory, China and Britain continued their feud.'3 4 When negotiations
ended, Britain acquired the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Is-
land from the Chinese through the 1860 Convention of Beijing." '
Approximately thirty years later, in 1898, Britain acquired a ninety-
128. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, arts. 12-14 (granting the HKSAR
full autonomy except in areas of foreign policy and defense); cf Macau Basic Law,
supra note 11, arts. 13-14 (limiting Macau's autonomy in the same areas).
129. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 505-06 (tracing Hong Kong's economic
growth as a British colony).
130. See id. at 507 (explaining the cause for Britain's trade deficit with China).
131. See id. (citing G.B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong 10 (2d ed. 1973))
(discussing why the British began trading opium with the Chinese).
132. See id. (detailing the causes of the Opium War, and describing why China
blocked the import of opium).
133. See Chan, supra note 51, at 141 (commenting that the method by which
Britain acquired Hong Kong was unfair).
134. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 508 (remarking on the lengthy battle be-
tween Britain and China over Hong Kong).
135. See Chan, supra note 51, at 147 (detailing the history of Hong Kong's
transfer of sovereignty to Britain).
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nine year lease to the New Territories. "' Today, Hong Kong consists
of the aforementioned areas.
Despite the lease covering the New Territories, China acknowl-
edged Britain to have jurisdiction over all the areas it received
through the Convention of Beijing.'" Based on this logic, it was rea-
sonable that all of the regions comprising Hong Kong would expire
simultaneously when the New Territories' lease lapsed in 1997."'
Thus, in 1984, when China and Britain discussed the consequences
of terminating the lease, Britain acquiesced to return all of its hold-
ings of Hong Kong. 3 9 China and Britain then formalized their nego-
tiations through the Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China ("Hong Kong Joint Declaration")."
C. HONG KONG JOINT DECLARATION
The Hong Kong Joint Declaration provided for the reversion of
Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China in July 1997.'4'
Similar to the Macau Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong Joint Decla-
ration laid the foundation for the way in which China would admin-
ister the colony after its reversion."2 The Declaration also authorized
136. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 509 (describing the areas that constitute
Hong Kong); see also Chan, supra note 51, at 147 (explaining that Britain was per-
sistent in its attempt to attain sovereignty over the New Territories because of in-
habitable conditions on other parts of Hong Kong).
137. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 509-10 (laying out the foundation for Brit-
ain's return of Hong Kong).
138. See id. at 510 (citing Patricia H. Palumbo, Analysis ofthe Sino-British Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong: What Do They Guarantee the Peo-
ple of Hong Kong After 1997?, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 667, 670-71 (1991)) (discuss-
ing why Britain ceded all of Hong Kong to China in 1997).
139. See Erik Alexander Rapoport, Ertradition and the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region, 4 ASIAN L.J. 135, 147 (1997) (stating why Britain was un-
fairly pressured into relinquishing its sovereignty over Hong Kong to China).
140. See generally Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 16 (documenting
the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China).
141. See id., Introduction (laying the foundation and principles for Hong Kong's
reversion).
142. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 511 (outlining the relevant provisions of
the Hong Kong Joint Declaration).
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the legislation of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which now serves as
the territory's mini-constitution.'
According to the Hong Kong Joint Declaration, the former British
colony became a SAR ("HKSAR") under Article 31 of China's con-
stitution. ' Although the Hong Kong Joint Declaration includes nu-
merous provisions, the most relevant concern Hong Kong's auton-
omy and the maintenance of its economic and social systems."'
Similar to that of Macau, the Hong Kong Joint Declaration provides
for Hong Kong's autonomy in all areas except foreign policy and de-
fense.' 46 In addition to granting Hong Kong enormous freedoms, the
Declaration also authorizes Hong Kong sovereignty over issues re-
lating to its legislature, judiciary, and executive branches of govern-
ment. 
4 7
Moreover, the Declaration promised the residents of Hong Kong
that they would continue to enjoy the benefits of Hong Kong's cur-
rent social system, including the exercise of civil liberties.' 8 More
importantly, the Declaration provided that Hong Kong would retain
its capitalist economic system for at least fifty years upon rever-
sion. 49 This aspect of the Hong Kong Joint Declaration sought,
143. See id. at 511-14 (giving a history of the origin and purpose of the Joint
Declaration).
144. See CHINA CONST., supra note 8, art. 31 (granting China the power to cre-
ate SARs).
145. See Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 16, art. 3 (refraining China
from interfering in Hong Kong's economic autonomy); see also Macau Joint Dec-
laration, supra note 3 (confirming China's approval of Macau's present capitalist
system).
146. See Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 16, art. 3 (describing the ar-
eas in which Hong Kong shall exercise autonomy).
147. See id. art. 3(3) (authorizing the HKSAR to govern itself in these areas of
government).
148. See id. art. 3(5), Annex I (XIII) (promising the people of Hong Kong the
right to continue enjoying basic democratic rights). The rights include "those of the
person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement,
of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research, and of
religious belief." Id.
149. See id. at Annex I (VI) (confirming China's promise that HKSAR maintain
its economic and trade systems). China will apply the concept behind the "One
Country, Two Systems" principle to Hong Kong for at least half a century. See id.
art. 3(12).
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among other things, to ensure foreign direct investors in Hong Kong
that their businesses would still flourish under the new regime.'"
D. HONG KONG BASIC LAW
The Hong Kong Basic Law codified the provisions set forth in the
Hong Kong Joint Declaration.' China approved the mini-
constitution even though Hong Kong leaders influenced the docu-
ment.152
The Hong Kong Basic Law authorizes retention of all laws previ-
ously in force in the region ' except those that oppose the Basic Law
or that of the PRC." The Hong Kong Basic Law is similar to the
Macau Basic Law because it also provides the HKSAR with inde-
pendent judicial power,' including final adjudication.'" As a result,
the Hong Kong Basic Law authorizes the HKSAR to form its own
judiciary, including the Court of Final Appeal.'" Among a list of
other provisions, the Hong Kong Basic Law specifies the require-
ments to assert the right of abode in Hong Kong.' Hong Kong resi-
150. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 525-27 (discussing Hong Kong's authority
over its commercial industry, and explaining the need for economic provisions in
the Joint Declaration to address concerns of foreign companies).
151. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9 (listing all rights granted to the
Hong Kong government and its citizens that were outlined in the Hong Kong Joint
Declaration).
152. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 528 (discussing the appointment of the
Hong Kong Basic Law drafting committee, and commenting on the composition of
the group).
153. See Huang & Qian, supra note 42, at 296-97 (analyzing the laws that com-
prise Hong Kong's legal system).
154. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 8 (describing in detail which
current laws are to remain in effect after reversion).
155. See Huang & Qian, supra note 42, at 300-01 (analyzing the similarities and
differences between Hong Kong and Macau's courts).
156. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 19 (discussing areas where
Hong Kong may exercise judicial autonomy); see also Macau Basic Law, supra
note 11, arts. 82-94 (describing the jurisdiction of the MSAR's judicial autonomy).
157. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 81 (discussing the various
courts the HKSAR may create, and authorizing the continuance of the judicial
system before reversion).
158. See id. art. 24 (detailing the conditions to be satisfied for a person to be-
come a HKSAR citizen).
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dents regard this provision as important '59 because it ensures their
right to exercise basic freedoms and maintain the capitalist system.""
In addition, the Hong Kong Basic Law permits fulfillment of in-
ternational agreements already enacted even though China is not a
signatory.'6' For these covenants to remain valid in Hong Kong,
however, the Hong Kong judiciary must codify these international
agreements into local laws.'12 Essentially, both the Hong Kong and
the Macau Basic Laws attempt to reassure their respective residents
that they will continue to enjoy the liberties previously granted to
them under British'63 and Portuguese rule.'
III. THE ROAD TO EROSION
A. FAREWELL BRITAIN, ADEUS PORTUGAL
Although Hong Kong and Macau are similar in that they both are
SARs under Deng Xiaoping's policy, their transitional periods dif-
fered significanty.'6 5 First, the international community was fasci-
159. See Spaeth et al., supra note 121, at 22 (noting that immigration was a
controversial issue for both England and China even before Hong Kong's rever-
sion).
160. See 145 Cong. Rec. El148-03, at El151 and accompanying text (com-
menting that before reversion, the Hong Kong and international community sus-
pected that China would cause a downward slope of the SAR's economic and
democratic freedoms after the transfer of sovereignty).
161. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 39 (explaining that this provi-
sion guarantees Hong Kong's commitment to the ICCPR, despite the SAR's rever-
sion).
162. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 51, at 163-64 (describing in detail the effective-
ness of the covenant and the procedure by which Hong Kong may remain subject
to the ICCPR after its reversion to China).
163. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, arts. 27-38 (distributing basic
democratic rights to Hong Kong residents).
164. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 26-39 (granting Macau residents
such civil liberties, including, but not limited to, democratic and criminal rights).
165. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 525 (illustrating concerns over [-long
Kong's economic and capitalist system after reversion); cf China Passes Law on
Stationing Troops in Macau After Handover, INSIDE CHINA TODAY (June 29,
1999) (visited June 29, 1999) <http://www.insidechina.com/news.php3?id=75918>
(describing Macau's unstable environment that China will gain back at the end of
the year); see generally Rik De Gendt, Macau Doesn't Fear Hand-Over, J. COM.,
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nated with Hong Kong's transition because it was the world's first
financial center to apply the "One Country, Two Systems" policy."'
Second, China did not have to address organized crime in Hong
Kong in 1997 as it did in Macau.' 6 Furthermore, because the inter-
national community scrutinized China's every move in 1997,"' it
was more difficult for the PRC to quickly intervene in Hong Kong's
autonomy upon reversion. 169
Macau's reversion, on the other hand, drew less attention world-
wide because it is not a vibrant, international city.'" In addition, its
transition faced more obstacles than its neighbor did.'" Unlike Hong
Kong,'72 Macau brought with it an unseasoned civil service ' coupled
July 22, 1999, at 7 (highlighting the difference in attitude of Hong Kong and
Macau residents regarding their reversions).
166. See Louise do Rosario, A Change of Dy'nastv: Macau, THE BANKER, Feb.
1, 1999, at 62 (comparing the transition periods of Hong Kong and Macau. stress-
ing the negative aspects of Hong Kong's transition period).
167. See id. (explaining the various social, political, and financial difficulties
Macau is facing as compared to Hong Kong).
168. See generally Martin Lee, Hong Kong 1997 Review Prospects jbr 1998,
in CSIS HONG KONG UPDATE (Jan. 1998) (visited July 1, 1999)
<http://ww.csis.org/html/hk5.html> (suggesting why China did not actualize the
international community's fears that Hong Kong would revert to socialism imme-
diately upon reversion).
169. See 145 Cong. Rec., E 1148-03, at El 148 and accompanying text (noting
the United States' concern regarding the application of the "'One Country, Two
Systems" policy to Hong Kong, causing Congress to appoint a committee to ex-
amine the situation); see also King-yuh, supra note 64, at I (discussing the domino
effect that would occur if China diverted from the "One Country, Two Systems"
policy after Hong Kong's reversion).
170. See Rosario, supra note 166, at 62 (describing Macau's present day atmos-
phere, economy, and transition period).
171. See Crime, Economy to Test Afacau 's Anointed Leader, MuzI LA ELINE
NEVS, May 16, 1999 (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http: dailynews.muzi.neu
cgi/lateline/news?p=29296> (describing a host of criminal and financial problems
presently affecting Macau).
172. See id. (commenting on Hong Kong's political, social, and economic envi-
ronment before it reverted to China).
173. See Interviei,-Macau's Untested Leadership a Problem, MUZI LArELINE
NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999 (visited Nov. 1. 1999) <http:, dailynews.muzi.net
/cgi/lateline/ news?p=22279> (explaining the character of Macau's cabinet to the
government body that administered the colony before the ratification of the Macau
Basic Law).
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with a history of rampant crime.' 74 Furthermore, when Hong Kong
reverted, Tung Chee-hwa,175 Hong Kong's Chief Executive leader,
selected government officials from a pool of experienced people.'
7
These individuals were able to tackle Hong Kong's problems without
soliciting Beijing's assistance. 7 In contrast, Macau's cabinet was
composed of less experienced government officials. 7 1 Such less-
seasoned leadership could impair the territory following the transi-
tion and make Macau more vulnerable to both gang violence'7" and
China.8 Given that Macau's transfer of sovereignty was more vola-
tile than Hong Kong's reversion,1 81 it is conceivable that Macau's
174. See Macau Governor Calls For Joint Anti-Crime Operation With China,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Sept. 24, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File
[hereinafter Joint Anti-Crime Operation] (describing the havoc that has consumed
Macau over the last few years).
175. See Tung Chee-hwa's Vision (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.primenet.
com/-ltseung/tung.htm> (describing Tung Chee-hwa's positions in the Hong Kong
government, including his professional experience and his outlook for Hong Kong
after reversion).
176. See Interview-Macau's Untested Leadership a Problem, supra note 173
(commenting on Tung Chee-hwa's appointments to the Hong Kong government
and their level of expertise).
177. See Crime, Economy to Test Macau 's Anointed Leader, supra note 171
(comparing levels of expertise between Macau and Hong Kong's cabinet, and ex-
plaining why Macau's government is at a disadvantage).
178. See Interview-Macau's Untested Leadership a Problem, supra note 173
(noting that Portuguese nationals will continue to hold certain key positions in
Macau's government after reversion); see also Rosario, supra note 166, at 62
(commenting that Portuguese governance predominated Macau's government, thus
Beijing's priority after Macau's reversion was to appoint more Macanese residents
to official posts).
179. See Lintner, supra note 19 (attributing the fears and attitude of gangsters in
Macau toward China to the mainland's reputation and exercise of capital punish-
ment).
180. See 145 Cong. Rec., El148-03, at E1151, and accompanying text (ex-
plaining that the international community should be cautioned that China may feel
obligated to intervene in Macau's autonomy in response to the crime wave that has
created an unstable financial and social environment in the region); see also Ro-
sario, supra note 166, at 62 (noting Macau's vulnerability to China in light of the
colony's previous laws, and querying whether the law will be able to adapt to
Macau's transformation into a SAR).
18 1. See Rosario, supra note 166, at 62 (explaining that Macau's turbulent tran-




government may invite Beijing to help it in combating crime. ' " An
unfortunate side effect of such action would likely be the erosion of
Macau's autonomy.'83
B. CHINA DROPS ITS GAVEL ON HONG KONG
When Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty on July 1,
1997, critics feared that the PRC would immediately intervene and
impose its own laws regarding economic and democratic freedoms."
Surprisingly, Beijing kept its commitment to preserving capitalism
and refrained from intervening during Asia's financial crisis. '" Two
years after the reversion, however, China eagerly accepted Hong
Kong's invitation to interpret a provision in the Basic Law on an is-
sue not pertaining to defense or foreign affairs.' * China's clarifica-
tion resulted in the erosion of the HKSAR's judicial autonomy.
Essentially, the PRC overruled the Court of Final Appeal's deci-
182. See Joint Anti-Crine Operation, supra note 174 (refemng to Macau's cur-
rent governor, Vasco Rocha Viera's request for China's cooperation in fighting or-
ganized crime). But see Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 10, 28 (granting
Macau the powers to preserve public order and enact its criminal laws).
183. Cf Gilley, supra note 17 (mentioning that critics fear that China's recent
overruling in Hong Kong coupled with the PRC's alteration of Macau's Basic Law
regarding the garrison reflect a slow erosion of the SARs' autonomy and detracts
from the "One Country, Two Systems" principle).
184. See Frank Ching, Hong Kong Reality Check, FAR E. ECON. RE%'. (June 3,
1999) (visited July 22, 1999) http://vw.feer.com/Restricted/99jun-03, cover.
html> (noting that the Hong Kong residents' fear of changes in the social and eco-
nomic realm were not immediately realized upon reversion).
185. See 145 Cong. Rec., El 148-03, at E 1148-03 and accompanying text (ob-
serving that the Hong Kong government has been able to exercise full autonomy in
its capitalist economic industry amidst all the concerns of Asia's recession).
186. See A Question of Interpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (noting China's in-
terpretation of Hong Kong's court ruling as legal and necessary even though the
Hong Kong courts did not request it); see also Hong Kong to Ask Beijing to Rein-
terpret its Constitution, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 19, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Group File (providing statistics for the vote on whether China had
the jurisdiction to interpret Hong Kong's Basic Law regarding the right of abode
issue).
187. See Lawyers, Activists Slain HK Gov't Over figrant Row, INSIDE CHINA
TODAY, June 29, 1999 (visited June 29, 1999) <http: /www.insidechina.com,
news.php3?id=75919> (referring to the effect China's interpretation of the Hong
Kong Basic Law had on the SAR's community).
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sion regarding the right of abode in Hong Kong at the HKSAR's re-
quest.' The Hong Kong Basic Law guarantees that all children born
to Hong Kong residents have the right to live in Hong Kong.8 9 The
breadth of this provision caused controversy in the courts " because
it failed to address illegitimate children and children who were born
to parents who were not residents before the child's birth. 9'
In January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong ruled
that children of Hong Kong residents have the right to live in the
SAR even though their parents were not Hong Kong residents before
their birth.' 9' In addition, Hong Kong's highest court held that ille-
gitimate children also fell under the protection of the Hong Kong Ba-
sic Law.'93 The prospect of a large influx of mainland immigrants
alarmed numerous Hong Kong residents
9 4 and Tung-Chee-hwa, 9
188. See Chan Kam Nga (An Infant) & ORS V Director of Immigration, 1999-I
HKC 347 (Hong Kong), (citing the Court of Final Appeal case regarding the right
of abode issue in Hong Kong, where the Court held that the petitioners had a right
of abode if one parent currently resided in Hong Kong).
189. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 24 (providing the guidelines
for attaining citizenship in the HKSAR). This article grants Chinese nationals or
foreigners who were born to Hong Kong residents the right to citizenship in the
HKSAR. See id.
190. See Frank Ching, Hong Kong Inviting Trouble: Appeal to Beijing Seen as a
Threat to Judicial Independence, FAR E. ECON. REV. (Jan. 21, 1999) (visited Nov.
2, 1999) <http://203.105.48.72/9901_21/p22hongkong.html> (discussing why
Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal granted certiorari to the immigration case).
191. See id. (explaining that the broad scope of the immigration provision in the
Basic Law resulted in confusion as to who legitimately qualifies for residency).
192. See id. (reporting on the Court of Final Appeal's ruling in Hong Kong in
favor of the immigrants).
193. See Frank Ching, Judgment Call, FAR E. ECON. REV. (Feb. 18, 1999) (vis-
ited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://203.105.48.72/9902_18/p22hongkong.html> (remarking
that the decision of Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal was so broad that massive
immigration would occur, if the government were to actually enforce the ruling).
194. See Frank Ching, Scare Tactics, FAR E. ECON. REV. (May 13, 1999) (vis-
ited Nov. 6, 1999) <http://www.feer.com/Restricted/99may-13/hongkong.html>
(estimating that surprisingly 1.6 million mainlanders could legitimately immigrate
to the HKSAR as a result of the court of final appeal's decision); see also Laris,
supra note 14, at A23 (monitoring Hong Kong's public view on the immigration
ruling).
195. See Bruce Einhorn, Tung Should Leave Hong Kong's Courts Alone, Bus.
WEEK, May 31, 1999 (describing Tung Chee-hwa's reaction after the Ilong
Kong's highest court's ruling).
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because they feared a rise in unemployment. To deter social and eco-
nomic problems that mass immigration could bring, such as over-
crowding, Tung-Chee-hwa immediately sought the PRC's interpre-
tation 96 of the right of abode provision in the Hong Kong Basic
Law. 97 The Chief Executive's other option was to ask Beijing for
permission to amend" the Basic Law, however, he chose the former
method because interpreting the law was more expedient."
On June 26, 1999, the Standing Committee: of the NPC in Bei-
jing overturned Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal's ruling regard-
ing the right of mainland children to live in Hong Kong.:;" The PRC
interpreted the Hong Kong Basic Law to read that at least one parent
must have been a resident at the time of the child's birth to obtain
residency. As a result of this clarification, critics fear that Beijing's
ruling has set a precedent that China has the authority to diminish
Hong Kong's autonomy.23
Although the Hong Kong leader requested the PRC's assistance
because it was allegedly in Hong Kong's best interest to prevent
widespread immigraton," China's willingness to accept the
196. See Ching, supra note 190 (explaining that the Hong Kong government
erred in asking China directly to interpret the Basic Law provision). The proper
procedure for seeking interpretation is for the judiciary to petition the Chinese
government. See id.
197. See Spaeth et al., supra note 121, at 22 (describing the implications of mass
immigration).
198. See Ching, supra note 194 (noting that the NPC is the sole group capable of
amending the Basic Law).
199. See Einhorn, supra note 195, at 25 (remarking on Tung Chee-hwa's super-
ficial approach to solving crises).
200. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 17-18, 20 (describing the re-
sponsibilities of the Standing Committee of the NPC).
201. See Laris, supra note 14, at A23 (reporting the PRC's overruling and its
implications).
202. See Mainlanders Stage Hunger Strike as Hong Kong Government Firm on
Abode, INSIDE CHINA TODAY, June 29, 1999 (visited June 29, 1999)
<http://wwv.insidechina.com/news.php3?id=76057> (illustrating a situation where
a mainlander could not become a resident of the HKSAR under the Basic Law).
203. See Laris, supra note 14, at A23 (quoting Hong Kong democracy activist,
Martin Lee, as remarking that China's overruling clearly signifies a constitutional
breakdown in the HKSAR).
204. See 145 Cong. Rec. El 148-03, at El 150, and accompanying text (explain-
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HKSAR's request on an issue outside its jurisdiction circumscribes
the Hong Kong Basic Law. 05 The PRC's intervention and alteration
of Hong Kong's law signifies erosion of the SAR's autonomy.0" The
PRC's revocation of Hong Kong's highest court's decision indicates
to the international community that despite the assurances of the Ba-
sic Law, Hong Kong is not completely autonomous in areas unre-
lated to defense and foreign affairs.2 7
C. THE HONG KONG MODEL VIS-A-VIS MACAU
China's recent interpretation of Hong Kong's Basic Law fore-
shadows its authority to alter Macau's mini-constitution after its re-. 208
version. Due to the PRC's involvement in Hong Kong's local af-
fairs,20 Macau's post-reversion future does not seem as bright.20
Over the past two years, Macau has suffered from an economic re-
cession, which, in addition to gang-related gambling disputes, has led
ing the HKSAR government's underlying reasons for seeking Beijing's interpreta-
tion). After the Court of Final Appeal's ruling, Hong Kong wanted to clarify any
misperceptions China may have had regarding the Hong Kong judiciary, and used
the problems associated with mass immigration as a disguise to gain public sup-
port. See id.
205. See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, arts. 2, 13-14 (granting -long
Kong the right to exercise full autonomy in various areas except in cases relating to
foreign affairs or defense).
206. See id. art. 19 (granting the HKSAR judicial system the right of final adju-
dication except in issues relating to foreign affairs or defense).
207. See A Question of Interpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing many
critics' views that China's action regarding the right of abode issue may set a
precedent for future constitutional crises).
208. See Macau Governor Says No Final Court Before Handover, MUZI
LATELINE NEWS (July 4, 1999) (visited Oct. 29, 1999) <http://dailynews.
muzi.net/cgi/lateline/news?p=34537> (suggesting that the failure to establish a
Court of Final Appeal in Macau before reversion makes the region vulnerable to
China's intervention in light of the PRC's recent overruling of the immigration
case in Hong Kong).
209. See Ching, supra note 184 (discussing how the "One Country" aspect of
Deng's policy is piercing through by means of China's intervention in Hong
Kong's internal affairs). Hong Kong's residents fear that their government's action
undermines the authority of the region's judicial and legal systems and sets a
precedent for Beijing to intervene in other local matters. See id.
210. See Zongshi, supra note 26, at 3 (commenting that Macau's residents an-
ticipate that reunification will not improve their problems).
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to a recent increase in gang violence.2" Despite China's lack of
authority over Macau at this time,212 the PRC has slowly invited itself
to help curb crime. 3 China mandated the stationing of People's Lib-
eration Army troops in Macau upon reversion.! This action angered
the Portuguese because the military presence was neither authorized
nor warranted under Macau's Joint Declaration or Basic Law.!" Un-
like Hong Kong, these documents do not explicitly authorize the
211. See Macau Preparing to Rejoin China After 400 Years of Colonial Rule.
CNN (Mar. 22, 1999) (visited June 29, 1999) <http://europe. cnn.com/WORLD/
europe/9903/22/MacauHandover.ap> (describing the host of problems that gam-
bling has brought into the region); see also Macau Review 1998, supra note 29, at
1 (explaining that the crimes associated with gambling have caused Macau's tour-
ism industry to plummet, which is detrimental to its economy).
212. See Rosario, supra note 166, at 62 (suggesting that upon Macau's reversion
China may consider intervention to end the violence because Macau will no longer
be under Portuguese sovereignty).
213. See Zhuhai Rounds Up Triads Before Macau Handover, MUzi LATELINE
NEWS (June 15, 1999) (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http://www.latelinenews.com.
cgi/lateline/news.cgi?p=3224&1=english> (reporting the significant efforts the
Chinese government has already undertaken in its own country to fight crime);
China Police in Anti-Crime Offensive to Prepare for Macau's Return, MUZI
LATELINE NEWS (May 31, 1999) (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <htip://latelinenews.
com/cgiIlateline/news.cgi?p=30740&l=english> (commenting that China enacted
a garrison law to be enforced in Macau, as the Macau Basic Law did not authorize
the stationing of Chinese troops in Macau). China's new law also gives the troops
the opportunity to exercise broad police powers, despite Macau's jurisdiction over
law enforcement. See id.; see also Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 14
(granting the MSAR authority over public order).
214. See China Passes Law on Stationing Troops in Macau -fter Handover, su-
pra note 165, at 7 (explaining the significance of China's decision to send a garri-
son to Macau).
215. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part 1), supra note 30, at question II
(explaining that China believed it was justified in its decision to send troops under
a broad interpretation of the defense provision of Article 14 of Macau's Basic
Law); see also Portugal's President Sampaio, China's Qian in Macau, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE (Mar. 18, 1999) (reporting that the Macau Basic Law does not
permit China to station troops in the region); see also Portugal Unhappy at
China's Macau Moves, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 1999) (visited May 25, 1999)
<http://news5thls.bbe.co.uk/hi/englishworld/europe/newsid%3010001301067.htm
>(reporting that the President of Portugal did not think that China was justified in
sending a garrison to Macau because of the absence of such language in Macau's
Basic Law).
216. See Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question 11
(noting that the Hong Kong Basic Law contains a provision that explicitly author-
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stationing of troops in the MSAR. '17 China, however, supports its po-
sition by stating that the stationing of troops is clearly within its ju-
risdiction because it concerns defense.218
The stationing of troops is a symbol of China's heavy hand and a
reminder that Macau is not completely autonomous. 2 9 The decision
to station troops is China's first step in eroding Macau's autonomy.220
It also reinforces the reality that the PRC has the final say regarding
the implementation of the Macau Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law.22'
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A VEHICLE TO ERODE MACAU'S
AUTONOMY
Critics fear that in addition to the garrison, China may attempt to
curb the violence in Macau by altering its criminal l. 222 Scur th vilene  c by i  it ltaws. uch ac-
tion would detract from Macau's autonomy because the Macau Basic
Law authorizes the SAR to control public order.223 Furthermore, po-
ized the PRC to send in a garrison in Hong Kong after its reversion); see also Hong
Kong Basic Law, supra note 9, art. 14 (stipulating the role of the garrison in Hong
Kong). China explicitly granted police powers to Hong Kong's garrison and made
the troops available to the SAR even though Hong Kong has sole responsibility for
preserving public order. See id.
217. See Backgrounder: ABCs of Macau SAR Basic Law (17), XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, at 1 (Apr. 8, 1999) (illustrating the controversy over China's alleged ju-
risdiction regarding the stationing of troops in the MSAR).
218. See id. (explaining that under Article 14 of Macau's Basic Law the Central
People's Government is responsible for Macau's defense, justifying China's deci-
sion to send in a garrison).
219. See Lintner, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining the purpose and significance
behind China's decision to send a garrison to Macau).
220. See China Passes Law on Stationing Troops in Macau After Handover, su-
pra note 165 (discussing the implications of China's new garrison). But see Macau
Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 14 (authorizing the MSAR with the power to main-
tain social stability). The new law that authorizes the stationing of troops is con-
trary to Macau's Basic Law. See id.
221. SeeA Question of Interpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that, in Hong
Kong, the Basic Law is considered a national law of China, and the NPC is the ul-
timate interpreter of that law).
222. See Gilley, supra note 17, at 2 (remarking that China's intervention in
Hong Kong's judicial autonomy together with its decision to grant law enforce-
ment responsibilities to the garrison in Macau reflect future constitutional erosion).
223. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 14 (granting the power to moni-
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licing the region is clearly not a defense or national security issue
that would prompt Beijing's attention.!" If the PRC were able to
convince the Macau government that the gang wars were within its
jurisdiction, then it is possible that China might attempt to impose
the death penalty or life imprisonment upon Macau's most violent
criminals.
Democracy activists are also concerned that China may interfere
in Macau's criminal laws because the gang violence has severely
threatened Macau's gambling and tourism industries, which signifi-
cantly contribute to the local economy. -' The head of the gambling
board in Hong Kong, Stanley Ho, who distributes gambling licenses
in Macau, has pressed the PRC and the Macau governments to im-
pose harsher sentences on gangsters. -27 Ho has even mandated the
implementation of the death penalty and has stated that he may not
renew Macau's gambling franchise if the violence is not resolved.
"
The denial of Macau's gambling license would be extremely debili-
tating to Macau's economy, which is a major concern of the PRC."
tor public order to the MSAR).
224. See 'Part 28' of ABCs of Macau SAR Basic Law, BEIJING XINHUA IN
ENGLISH (Apr. 13, 1999) (visited June 21, 1999) <http://199.2212.15.21 I/cgi-
bin/cqcg... 5+6+7+8+9+10+CQDOC_ MARKUPSTYLE= 1> (commenting that
the handling of criminal activity falls under Macau's local affairs).
225. See Joint Anti-Crime Operation, supra note 174, at I (noting that Macau's
Governor has requested China's help in combating the recent rise in organized
crime).
226. See Lintner, supra note 19, at 3 (reporting the dramatic decrease in the
gambling revenues); see also Gilley, supra note 17, at 2 (providing statistics indi-
cating the decline in tourism is due to violence).
227. See Macau Risk Pointers, GEOPOLITICAL SENTINEL WORLD RISK
POINTERS-CHINA AND NORTHEAST ASIA-MACAU (1999) (visited Oct. 30, 1999)
<http://wwv.janes.com/geopol/sentinel/CNARSA/CNARSA_Macau.html> (con-
veying a supporter's view on the implementation of capital punishment in Macau).
228. See Harold Bruning, Portuguese President Erpects Death Penalty Ban to
Continue, HONG KONG STANDARD IN ENGLISH (Feb. 18, 1997) (visited June 25,
1999) <http://199.221.15.211/cgibinlcqcg... 5+6+7+8+9+1 0+CQDOC_.MARK-
UPSTYLE=l> (quoting a casino owner in Macau as saying that in order to regain
Macau's social and economic stability, Macau must institute capital punishment).
229. See Rosario, supra note 166, at 62 (indicating Macau's dependence on its
gambling and tourism industry); see also Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3,
art. 4 (explaining that China and Portugal are interested in maintaining the stability
of Macau's economy after reversion).
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Thus, this pressure on the PRC to intervene and strengthen Macau's
law enforcement capabilities may lead China to justify its efforts to
diminish Macau's autonomy in exchange for economic and social
stability.230
If China decides not to directly intervene, other critics argue that it
may instead exert pressure on Macau to institute harsher punish-
ments, including the death penalty.23' Macau has the authority to alter
its criminal laws through its Penal Code.232 If Macau changes its laws
to include the death penalty, the international community may criti-
cize such an amendment, because it would contradict the principles
of the ICCPR, which is codified in the Basic Law233 and the Macau
Joint Declaration.
234
Macau may also conceivably attempt to follow Hong Kong's steps
and request that Beijing interpret its Basic Law or amend it to in-
clude harsher penalties.23 ' As evident in Hong Kong, the PRC would
230. See Gilley, supra note 17, at 1 (explaining China's renewed interest in
maintaining Macau's stability); see also Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 18
(granting China the authority to intervene in situations where national security is
threatened or in times of emergency). The article specifically stipulates that the
PRC can intervene in the event that the Standing Committee of the NPC decides to
declare a state of war, by reason of turmoil within the MSAR, which endangers
national unity or security and is beyond the control of the government. See id.; see
also Wang & Leung, supra note 1, at 287 (explaining that if the SAR is unstable
then it inevitably affects China as a whole).
231. See Macau Risk Pointers, supra note 227 (recognizing one possible influ-
ential supporter for the implementation of capital punishment in Macau). Ho may
have some clout over China and Macau because he distributes Macau's gambling
licenses, which significantly affect Macau's autonomy. See id. But see Bruning,
supra note 228, at 17 (expressing Portugal's confidence that capital punishment
will not be exercised in Macau even after the colony's reversion). The prohibition
on capital punishment is part of Macau's cultural heritage. See id. (noting that the
death penalty has not been a part of Macau's criminal law since the mid-nineteenth
century).
232. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 85 (stating that Macau's previous
criminal system shall be maintained); see also 'Part 28' of ABCs of Macau SAR
Basic Law, supra note 224 (noting that the MSAR has the full power to implement
local criminal laws under its Basic Law).
233. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 40 (allowing Macau to maintain
its affiliation with the ICCPR).
234. See Macau Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, at VIII (explaining the
continued application of previous international agreements).
235. See Macau Government Drafts New Penal Code, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
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likely welcome such an invitation,26 notwithstanding the probability
that this would violate the Macau Basic Law2: ' and possibly Macau's
commitment to the ICCPR.2-'
Allowing Macau's government to curb the violence as mandated
under the Macau Basic Law is the most appropriate way to handle
this situation2 9 China, however, may find this method ineffective
because despite Portuguese sovereignty, Macau has primarily con-
trolled its own law enforcement in recent years and has proven inca-
pable of curbing the violence.4' If Macau remains incapable of stabi-
lizing the region on its own, the PRC may internene under the
disguise of a state of emergency.'
Nov. 17, 1995 (commenting that only the future government can determine
whether the death penalty ought to continue); see also Macau Basic Law, supra
note 11, art. 143 (stating that the Standing Committee of the NPC authorizes the
Macau courts the power to interpret the provisions of the Basic Law that are within
the SAR's autonomy). If the provision is not within the MSAR's jurisdiction, the
Macau Court of Final Appeal shall seek the Standing Committee's interpretation
before the court makes its final judgment. See id.
236. See Top Chinese Official Confident Guangdong Police Can Curb Mcau
Crime, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 19, 1999 (reporting that a high-ranking
Communist Party official in China's Guangdong Province expressed confidence in
the ability of the Chinese police to resolve Macau's crime problems after reversion
without interfering in its internal affairs).
237. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 12-14, 18 (granting Macau full
autonomy in all areas except foreign affairs, defense, and national security). Proce-
durally, when a provision of law is not within the MSAR's jurisdiction, the Macau
Court of Final Appeal requests the Standing Committee of the NPC to interpret the
law prior to the Court's final adjudication. See id. (allowing the Standing Com-
mittee to express its opinion on matters China considers within its jurisdiction).
238. See Observations of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 115, at B(3)
(explaining Macau's obligation to the ICCPR, despite its reversion to a non-
signatory). But see Chan, supra note 51, at 163-67 (explaining that for the ICCPR
to be binding in the HKSAR, it must be codified through its local law).
239. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 14 (delegating to the Macau gov-
ernment the authority to control public order).
240. See supra notes 221-25, 232-37 and accompanying text (detailing China's
concern over the recent crime wave in Macau, and addressing fears that China's
responsive actions may result in a reduction in Macau's governing freedom); see
also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, U.S. Department of State, Macau Countr Report on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1998, supra note 75, at I (describing the civilian composition of Macau's
police force and the fact that there is no Portuguese army presence in Macau).
241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (reiterating Article 18 of the
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Although Macau's dilemma concerns crime rather than the right of
abode issue in Hong Kong, the two situations are similar because
neither falls within China's jurisdiction. Moreover, it is conceiv
able that Macau may follow in Hong Kong's footsteps because
Macau residents have already approved China's decision to send a
garrison, even though the Basic Law does not explicitly authorize
such intervention.243 Accordingly, the international community
should closely monitor China and Macau in order to prevent any po-
tential constitutional crises.2"
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the recent crime wave that has engulfed Macau 14 and
China's recent overruling of Hong Kong's highest court's decision,"'
Macau must take precautions to safeguard its autonomy from China
in areas outside of China's jurisdiction.247 Essentially, there are three
approaches that Macau may take to protect its autonomy from
China's possible intervention.
These recommendations are mostly derived from an analysis of
the Hong Kong model.2 8 In addition, because Hong Kong and Macau
Macau Basic Law).
242. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 13-14; Hong Kong Basic Law,
supra note 9, arts. 13-14 (prohibiting Macau and Hong Kong from interfering on
issues related to foreign affairs and defense).
243. See Gilley, supra note 17, at 1 (commenting on the attitude of Macau resi-
dents regarding China's decision to bring soldiers into Macau).
244. See Observations of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 115 (noting
that the United Nations is closely monitoring the situation in Macau). See, e.g., su-
pra notes 122, 169, 180 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the interna-
tional community is monitoring China with respect to both Hong Kong and Macau,
and is sensitive to any potential constitutional violations in the region).
245. See Gangsterland, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 1998, at 41 (reporting that
since 1997, approximately 20 people, including three civil servants, have died as a
result of gang violence in Macau).
246. See Lawyers, Activists Slam HK Gov't Over Migrant Row, supra note 187
(reporting that lawyers and pro-democracy legislators regard China's overruling of
Hong Kong's highest court's decision as destructive to the independence of the
SAR's judiciary).
247. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 2, 13-14 (granting Macau
autonomy in all areas except foreign affairs and defense).
248. See A Question of Interpretation, supra note 13 (justifying China's inter-
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are facing similar dilemmas,' 4' recommendations for Hong Kong are
also applicable to Macau. The suggestions to Macau's government
may be summarized accordingly. First, Macau can petition China to
amend its Basic Law.2-0 Second, Macau can amend its Penal Code to
maintain its criminal laws. -' Third, Macau can implement institu-
tional safeguards to preserve the sanctity of its judicial system.:
A. AMENDING MACAU'S BASIC LAW
Amending the Macau Basic Law is the most democratic and con-
stitutional way to preserve Macau's autonomy. ': The PRC may not
favor this method, however, because it is slow "' and, thus, the PRC
would be unable to adapt to emergencies, such as the violence in
Macau. Amending the Basic Law may also appear inefficient be-
pretation of the Basic Law provision regarding right of abode).
249. See Spaeth et al., supra note 121, at 22 (explaining recent instances where
China has intervened in Hong Kong's local affairs and its implications); see also
Gilley, supra note 17 (discussing potential erosion of the mini-constitution based
on China's authorization of troops).
250. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 144 (granting the NPC the
authority to amend Macau's Basic Law); see also Spaeth et al., supra note 12 1, at
22 (noting that constitutional experts and local democrats suggest amending the
Basic Law); Conor O'Clery, A Bamboo Curtain Faces Hong Kong, IRISH TIMES,
May 22, 1999, at 11 (proposing that amending the Hong Kong Basic Law would
be preferred to reinterpreting it because the latter would be subversive to judicial
autonomy in the SAR).
251. See China Said to Have Accepted New Penal Code That Bans Death Pen-
alty and Abortion, THE BRITISH BROAD. CORP., Nov. 9, 1995 (explaining that the
purpose of negotiating the abolishment of the death penalty, abortion, and life im-
prisonment in Macau's penal code is to prevent China from amending the code af-
ter reversion).
252. See Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, Lessons froin Hong Kong, ASIA WEEK,
Mar. 26, 1999, at 8 (suggesting that Hong Kong should establish constitutional
measures, such as judicial review, to forestall China's interference with the SAR's
autonomy).
253. See Spaeth et al., supra note 121, at 22 (explaining that amending the Basic
Law is more legally sound than interpreting the provisions because the latter may
give the Central Government broad powers). For example, because Beijing has the
power to interpret the provisions of the Basic Law under special circumstances, the
PRC has been able to intervene in Hong Kong's local affairs when they were
clearly within Hong Kong's jurisdiction. See id.
254. See Einhorn, supra note 195, at 25 (discussing the advantages and disad-
vantages of constitutional amendments).
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cause the Standing Committee of the NPC, which is the only group
that has the authority to amend the mini-constitution,"' only meets
annually.25 6 Thus, if the matter is one of grave concern, such as the
escalation of gang violence in Macau,"7 China may select another
more expedient method to solve the problem.
Due to the heightened crime in Macau, some think it possible that
the PRC may attempt to usurp Macau's autonomy regarding its
criminal laws.25  Macau should ask Beijing to insert explicit language
in the Basic Law that abolishes capital punishment. "" To protect its
citizens from capital punishment, the MSAR must not leave any
loopholes in the Basic Law that would allow Beijing to infer that the
death penalty or life imprisonment can be used as a form of defense
or national security.2 6 China has already enacted a garrison law un-
255. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 144 (stipulating that the NPC has
the authority to amend the Basic Law).
256. See Spaeth et al., supra note 121, at 22 (noting that the Standing Committee
of the NPC would not have been able to amend the HK Basic Law regarding the
right to abode until the following year); see also Ching, supra note 194 (discussing
when the NPC will next convene).
257. See China, Portugal to Discuss Macau Return to Beijing (Mar. 17, 1999)
(visited June 29, 1999) <http://forums.mercurycenter.com/asia/docs/070550.html>
(noting China's attentiveness to the violence that has recently disturbed Macau).
258. See Harold Bruning, Garrison Law Gain, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
16, 1999, at 19 (reporting on China's newly enacted garrison law, effective upon
Macau's reversion, which permits China to station troops in the region and
authorizes the soldiers to conduct police duties). This article also suggests that the
garrison law is not an encroachment on the SAR's local autonomy. See id. But see
Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 14 (characterizing the garrison law as con-
trary to the Macau Basic Law because it grants the troops local law enforcement
responsibilities); Questions & Answers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at ques-
tion I I (noting that defense is a broad concept which may authorize China to exer-
cise certain rights not explicitly granted to it under the SAR's Basic Law).
259. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 28 (stipulating that "torture or
inhuman treatment of any resident shall be prohibited"). But see Questions & An-
swers on Macau (Part I), supra note 30, at question 20 (explaining that according
to the Chinese Embassy, the death penalty will not be exercised in the enclave after
its reversion despite the lack of explicit language in the text of the Basic Law be-
cause of the MSAR's independent legislative authority).
260. See 'Part 28' of ABCs of Macau SAR Basic Law, supra note 224 (explain-
ing that the Macau Basic Law does not abolish the death penalty because it is a
purely local criminal matter and is within Macau's autonomy to decide whether it
wants to administer such punishment).
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der the defense clause of the Basic Law;26' thus it is not unlikely that
it would try to do the same with the death penalty, if the crime in
Macau persists.
Macau should also petition China to rewrite any broad provisions
of the Basic Law.262 For example, Article 138 of the Basic Law states
that "[international agreements to which the People's Republic of
China is not a party but which are implemented in Macau may con-
tinue to be implemented in the Macau Special Administrative Re-
gion. 263 The word "may" implies that China has the discretion to
prevent Macau from exercising its commitment to such international
agreements .26 Thus, in order to protect its autonomy regarding inter-
national treaties, Macau should request that China change the word
"may" to "shall," thereby changing the provision from discretionary
to mandatory.
Another area that requires clarification is the term "exceptional
circumstances. 26 ' The PRC may interpret any provision of Macau's
Basic Law that is unrelated to foreign affairs or defense if justified as
a matter of "exceptional circumstance."2" Due to the inherent vague-
ness of the term, Macau should amend the Basic Law to explicitly
261. See Bruning, supra note 258 (discussing the enactment and purpose of
China's new law regarding the troops).
262. See 145 Cong. Rec., El 148-03 at E 1150 and accompanying text (noting
that the Hong Kong government had several choices in addressing the Court of Fi-
nal Appeal's decision).
263. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 138 (authorizing the MSAR's
affiliation with former international agreements).
264. See Suimnary Record of the 31st Meeting: Portugal Macau. 26'11196, U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15th Sess., 31st mtg., para.
19, U.N. Doe. EJC.12/1996/SRI31 (1996) (explaining the particular language
China chose in drafting the Macau Joint Declaration regarding international cove-
nants).
265. See A Question of Iterpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (explaining that the
HKSAR had the right to seek Beijing's intervention because the right of abode
case was an exceptional circumstance).
266. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 143 (explaining in which cases
the courts in the MSAR may ask the PRC to interpret provisions concerning the
relationship between China and Macau). See, e.g.. Ng Ka Ling (-n Infant & Anor
v. Director of Immigration, (Court of Final Appeal, Feb. 26, 1999) 1999-1 HKC
425 (citing a right to abode case where the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal con-
sidered the immigration issue to be an exceptional situation).
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define which situations constitute "exceptional circumstances," to
prevent Hong Kong's constitutional crisis from reoccurring in
267
Macau.
If Macau does not ask China to amend such broad language in its
Basic Law, China may interpret the law to benefit the Central Gov-
ernment. 6 ' Evidence of such broad interpretation in favor of the PRC
has already been seen in both Macau269 and Hong Kong. For exam-
ple, despite China's lack of jurisdiction, the PRC has successfully
ordered a garrison against Portugal's wishes under the broad provi-
sion concerning defense.27 ' Similarly, in Hong Kong, the right of
abode provision was written so broadly 272 in its Basic Law that China
was able to clarify the provision to prevent mainland immigrants
from reuniting with their Hong Kong resident parents. 27' Given that
China broadly interprets Basic Law provisions to benefit the PRC,1
4
it is crucial that Macau ask China to amend any vague provisions in
its mini-constitution to safeguard its autonomy.
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267. See A Question ofInterpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (providing the -long
Kong Government's reasoning for regarding the right of abode situation as an ex-
ceptional circumstance that invoked Beijing's authority to interpret the Basic
Law).
268. See Backgrounder: ABCs of Macau SAR Basic Law (17), supra note 217
(remarking that although the stationing of troops is not covered in the Basic Law, it
is authorized under the defense clause).
269. See id. (reporting that China's decision to send an army into Macau was in
response to its interpretation of Macau's Basic Law).
270. See Lee, supra note 168 (commenting on the reasons why the HKSAR's
courts have no basis to challenge China, and thus confirming China's authority
over Hong Kong's administration of its Basic Law).
271. See Backgrounder: ABCs of Macau SAR Basic Law (17), supra note 217
(justifying China's use of troops in Macau); see also Macau Basic Law, supra note
11, art. 14 (containing the defense exception).
272. See Ching, supra note 190 (referring to the broad manner in which the
Hong Kong Basic Law may be interpreted).
273. See O'Clery, supra note 250, at 11 (commenting on a case in which a Chi-
nese resident was denied the right to reunite with a family member that was a
Hong Kong resident as a result of China's decree).
274. See Wang, supra note 252, at 8 (reiterating that China is the ultimate inter-
preter of the Basic Law).
275. See Hong Kong Government Gets Public Support, Media Lashing on China
Abode Move, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 19, 1999 (reporting that a Hong Kong
paper stated that the HKSAR's invitation to China to reinterpret the law was seen
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B. AMENDING MACAU'S PENAL CODE
In response to the heightened crime, Macau should also consider
protecting its citizens from capital punishment and life imprisonment
by implementing extradition276 language in its Penal Code'." Macau's
criminal law reflects domestic concerns.2-' Hence, Macau could
change its Penal Code without China's approval as long as it does
not infringe upon the Basic Law.2" Macau would not be opposing
China or its Basic Law by inserting clear language : ' in its Penal
Code that prohibits individuals from extradition to China. : ' The Ba-
sic Law authorizes Macau's enforcement of the ICCPR ' - and permits
the existence of Macau's former criminal procedure system."' Thus,
extradition language in the Macau Penal Code would codify the prin-
ciples of the ICCPR and allow Macau to carry on the Portuguese
principles of rehabilitation for its criminals.2'
in a negative light for various reasons).
276. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (Pocket ed. 1996) (defining extradi-
tion). Extradition means "1. to surrender or deliver (a fugitive) to another jurisdic-
tion, 2. to obtain the surrender of(a fugitive) from another jurisdiction." Id.
277. See Death Penalty Excluded fiom New Penal Code, THE BRITISH BROAD.
CORP., Nov. 1, 1994 (commenting on Portugal's position regarding whether extra-
dition language should be transcribed into Macau's Penal Code).
278. See 'Part 28' of ABCs of Macau SAR Basic Law, supra note 224 (asserting
that Macau's enactment of criminal laws is a domestic affair, which is within the
MSAR's jurisdiction); see also Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 14, 85 (al-
luding to Macau's jurisdiction over Macau's criminal laws).
279. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 1I (prohibiting Macau from en-
acting any law that contradicts the Macau Basic Law).
280. See Death Penalty Excluded fronz New Penal Code, supra note 277 (noting
Portugal's desire to insert a clear rule regarding extradition in Macau's Penal
Code).
281. See id. (discussing why China is displeased with Macau's insistence that
extradition language be added to its Penal Code).
282. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 40 (permitting Macau to remain
under the ICCPR's umbrella).
283. See id. art. 85 (authorizing Macau's extension of the existing penal code).
284. See Macau Government Drafts New Penal Code, supra note 235 (explain-
ing the history behind Portugal's decision to abolish the death penalty and life im-
prisonment in Portugal and Macau).
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C. IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
In addition to amending the Basic Law and the Penal Code, Macau
should implement institutional safeguards into its judicial system.
China's establishment of a Court of Final Appeal2 81 in Macau indi-
cates that the Macau judiciary is the ultimate authority in deciding
issues unrelated to foreign affairs and defense. The judiciary, how-
ever, may ask China to interpret the provisions of the Basic Law8
under "exceptional circumstances." '287 This approach grants the PRC
overwhelming power to override decisions with which it disagrees,
as evidenced by China's overruling of Hong Kong's Court of Final
Appeal. Thus, in order to preserve the sanctity of the judicial system,
the MSAR should mandate an institutional check and balance sys-
tem, such as judicial review."'
The foregoing constitutional mechanism is indispensable because
it would protect Macau's judicial autonomy from China's unwar-
289ranted interventions. More importantly, it would prevent the ex-
ecutive branch from seeking China's interpretation of Macau's Basic
Law.' ° Macau's judicial system is highly autonomous in nature, and
285. See Macau Governor Says No Final Court Before Handover, supra note
208 (commenting on the problems that prevented Portugal and China from estab-
lishing Macau's court of final appeal before reversion); see also Macau Basic Law,
supra note 11, art. 84 (discussing the creation of the Court of Final Appeal and de-
scribing its responsibilities).
286. See O'Clery, supra note 250, at 11 (explaining why China's interpretation
would erode the SAR's autonomy); see also Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art.
143 (giving the Macau government guidelines on how to seek interpretation of the
Basic Law from the Standing Committee of NPC).
287. See A Question of Interpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing why the
NPC is the only committee that has the authority to amend the Basic Law).
288. See Wang, supra note 252, at 8 (providing a constitutional alternative that
Hong Kong may use to prevent China from imposing on Hong Kong's rnle of
law).
289. See Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, art. 19 (granting the Court of Final
Appeal with the power of final adjudication in all areas except foreign affairs and
defense). No department of the Central Government may interfere with Macau's
domestic matters. See id. art. 22.
290. See HK Constitutional Row Looms Over China Immigrants, supra note 120
(discussing the proper channels for a SAR to have the Basic Law interpreted). But
see A Question of Interpretation, supra note 13, at 17 (explaining the benefits of
having the Standing Committee of the NPC interpret the Basic Law).
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judicial review would preserve the fundamental rights and freedoms
of Macau's citizens.-' Without judicial review, Macau's judicial
autonomy may fall prey to China's heavy hand "92 because China does




On the eve of the millennium, the curtain closed on the oldest col-
ony in East Asia. China reunified another piece of the puzzle to the
mainland. Macau, unlike Hong Kong, brings with it heavy baggage
including a weak economy, inexperienced leaders, and widespread
gang violence. Although China has attempted to assure the interna-
tional community and Macau that it will not interfere in issues unre-
lated to foreign affairs or defense, China may not abide by its com-
mitment. China's recent overruling of Hong Kong's Court of Final
Appeal adds credibility to this fear. In order for Macau to flourish, it
must take advantage of the "One Country, Two Systems" policy and
exercise its autonomy to the fullest extent by amending its Basic Law
and Penal Code and effectuating institutional safeguards. Despite un-
certainties, as Macau familiarizes itself with its SAR status, Macau
should take concrete steps to secure prosperity for its people that will
survive beyond the next century.
291. See Macau: The Judicial System, supra note 79 (describing the characteris-
tics of Macau's judicial system); see Macau Basic Law, supra note 11, arts. 27-39
(granting various civil rights to Macau citizens).
292. See Spaeth et al., supra note 121, at 22 (stating various examples in which
China has encroached in some of Hong Kong's internal affairs including its crimi-
nal laws).
293. See Wang, supra note 252, at 8 (giving a constitutional solution for Hong
Kong's predicament).
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